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The paper addresses the issues about grammatical intuitions in a pro-
grammatic sketch. The fi rst part deals with epistemology of such intu-
itions and defends a moderate Voice-of-competence view in discussion 
with Michael Devitt, the ordinarist, who sees them as products of gen-
eral intelligence or Central Processing Unit. The second part deals with 
the problem for their validity and offers a compromise solution: linguis-
tic intuitions are valid because their object the standard linguistic enti-
ties, are production -and response-dependent. Competence does dictate 
what is correct, and what is not, the order of determination goes from the 
internal to the external, or external-seeming language items. An external 
token string has linguistic properties because it would be interpreted as 
having them by the normal language-hearer and would be produced by a 
process that would form it respecting the nature of these properties. The 
solution is briefl y situated on the map of general response-dependentism.
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1. Introduction
The paper is dedicated to Michael Devitt (to be called just “Michael” 
in the sequel), and continues our long and fruitful discussion about 
linguistic, in particular syntactic, intuitions. It has two parts, the fi rst 
more epistemological, but on the non-normative side, the second more 
metaphysical. Let me say a few words about each. The main epistemo-
logical debate in philosophy of language concerns people’s linguistic in-
tuitions. Let me borrow an example from Isaac (2008: 178) to illustrate 
the kind of items that will be discussed in the paper. Suppose a linguist 
confronts John, a native speaker, with a following sentence:
 (H*) “Herself loves Mary”.
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Is this a sentence of your language, the linguist asks. No, answers John. 
John has clear feeling that something is amiss with (H*), and the feel-
ing gives rise to the judgment and belief expressed by his report “No”. 
The feeling, the belief-state and the judgment, and sometimes even the 
report (all of them, or at least some of them) are called “intuition”; I 
will reserve the term for the fi rst three of them. A famous recent tradi-
tion in philosophy of language and linguistics, initiated by Chomsky 
takes intuitions as the main source of data for the linguist. The tradi-
tion equally sees them as products of linguistic competence; the term 
is ambiguous between the ability and the mechanism, so I will use it 
for both, but most often for the later. I agree with the general idea, 
but I would like to allow that many opinions that people voice as their 
“intuitions” contain a lot of material not produced by, and therefore not 
revelatory of, the pure linguistic competence. (I have been defending 
similar views about other competences like the, logical and the spa-
tial-geometrical ones). I have been calling my own line “the Moderate 
Voice-of-competence view”, since it takes competence as basic, but al-
lows for very strong interferences or external contributions to the pro-
duction of intuition. John’s intuition at best points to a discreet voice of 
competence. So, the Moderate Voice-of-Competence view that I would 
like to develop and briefl y defend here, claims that intuitions form a 
kind, albeit relatively superfi cial one, shearing their phenomenal prop-
erties classically described by Descartes in his Regulae and Principles. 
in terms of “clear and distinct cognition”, of being „present and appar-
ent to an attentive mind, (Principle XLV, 168). And there is a capac-
ity, or rather several of them associated with intuition. Further, they 
are extroverted, turned towards the items they are explicitly about, 
and normatively answerable to them, since they want them to teach us 
about things “outside” (possibly in Platonic heaven), not merely about 
our representation(s) of them). The view also takes seriously the actual 
dialectics of having intuitions: asking (or being asked) a question, then 
going through imagining a scenario, if necessary putting oneself in the 
shoes of the imagined person (or a person-like entity, say, zombie), and 
then giving a simple, preliminary answer to the question, formulat-
ing the immediate intuition, often to be developed by considering other 
examples, and so on. This intuition-related effort involves a lot more 
than mere inference following rules of logic. Further, the view is for the 
most part committed to realism about the objects of intuitions, and in 
the second part of the paper I develop a moderately realistic view about 
linguistic entities. The view is very keen on the explainability of intu-
itions. Finally, it offers a somewhat complex answer about their norma-
tive epistemic status, tilted towards aposteriority: although intuitions 
are prima face a priori, their refl ective justifi cation has a rich structure 
in which a posteriori elements play a crucial role.
The theories on the opposite end favors deny the specifi c nature of 
intuitions, insist on holistic non-a priori justifi cation, and see them as 
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products of general intelligence. Let me call this pole “ordinarism”; it 
has been invented long time ago in ethics, with Ewing (1971) and other 
moral intuitionists, like More (1991), in some of their moods), but is be-
ing now re-discovered for other domains, generalized and put forward 
in vigorous manner by Michael (Devitt 2005, 2006, 2012), and specifi -
cally for philosophical intuitions T. Williamson (2007). 
I disagree with Michael’s mistrust. He is an empiricist about lin-
guistic intuitions, and he is comparing them to expert judgments, pa-
leontologist in the fi eld searching for fossils. She sees a bit of white 
stone sticking through grey rock, and responds immediately “a pig’s 
jawbone.” (Devitt 2012: 560), art experts correctly judging an allegedly 
sixth-century Greek marble statue to be a fake; of the tennis coach, Vic 
Braden, correctly judging a serve to be a fault before the ball hits the 
ground (Devitt 2006a: 104).
The second part of the paper deals with the further problem: where 
does the validity our intuitions come from? In order to answer it, it 
briefl y visits the location problem for language, whether it is essen-
tially E-language situated in the outside world, or I-language, inhabit-
ing only the mind of speaker-hearer) and offers a compromise solution: 
standard linguistic entities are production- and response-dependent. 
An external token string has linguistic properties because it would be 
interpreted as having them by the normal language-hearer, and would 
be produced by a process that would form it respecting the nature of 
these properties. The solution is then briefl y situated on the map of 
general response-dependentism.
2. Linguistic intuitions: The voice of competence
2.1. Intuitionism-competentinalism
Let us then start from scratch. The typical context in which linguists 
speak about intuitions is the one of linguistic research. The linguist 
presents a string of sounds (phonemes, letters) to the native speaker 
of the language investigated (often to oneself, if the language is one’s 
mother tongue), and asks her to decide if this would be a sentence of 
her language. The immediate judgments prompted by the question are 
described as linguistic intuitions.
I shall here re-use my older examples, since I have changed my 
explanation at one important point, thanks to Michael, and I want to 
stress the continuity and discontinuity with my former presentations. 
To have a handy example I have borrowed from a fi ne introduction to 
Chomsky by John Collins (2008) a pair of sentences testing the predi-
cate nominal agreement:
 (W) They want to be teachers.
 (W*) *They want to be teacher.
Imagine a native speaker, Ann, accepting the fi rst and rejecting the 
second. Perhaps Ann sort of rehearsed the sentences in her inner fore, 
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asking herself whether she would say them, simulating actual saying, 
as the standard description goes. The next example is our already men-
tioned
 (H*) “Herself loves Mary”.
rejected in our story by the naïve subject John. Finally, here is the co-
reference example.
 (M) Mary knows that Jane loves herself.
(M) can be taken in two ways: the incorrect one, according to which 
Jane loves Mary, and the correct one, which is obvious. So, suppose 
the linguist asks the naïve subject John two questions and receives the 
following answers:
 Q: Does Mary know that Jane loves her, Mary?
 A: Of course, not.
 Q: So, whom does Jane love?
 A: She loves herself, Jane.
So, how are Ann’s and John’s cognitive apparatuses arriving to the ver-
dict? Following the lead from the Chomskyan tradition, I would claim 
that it is mobilizing the particular competence, i.e. the same cognitive 
resource that produces or fails to produce similar sentences in real-life 
speaking. It is the competence itself that is doing the work, the central 
processor at best just passively reports the verdict of the competence, 
which is the intuition. Michael would claim that Ann’s and John’s ap-
paratuses are mobilizing the cognitive resource that is normally in 
charge of understanding sentences. Ann’s resource outputs the verdict 
Yes for the fi rst sentence (W), and No, for the second (W*), in some 
neural code. John’s outputs a No for the (H*) sentence. If the resource 
is competence (the particular, i.e. linguistic one, then the result is the 
voice of competence.
I will take is as agreed by all sides that the fi rst stage must be a 
tentative production of the sentence, and I would add that it is being 
rehearsed and analyzed by Ann’s competence. I mentioned that com-
petence presumably comes out with some kind of answer, some Yes 
or No signal. I will argue that this is the most important element, the 
core, of the fi nal intuition. The next stage is empirical theorizing at 
sub-personal level; Ann’s central processor, CP for short, has to inter-
pret the message, decides how to treat it, and then translate the mes-
sage into the spontaneous belief, what we call intuition. The rest is 
reporting, producing the verbal output. This linguistic intuitional out-
put has a very narrow range. Intuitions reported are formulated in an 
austere vocabulary, featuring mainly “acceptable” vs. “non-acceptable”. 
So what does this tell us about folk-concept of grammaticality? Distin-
guish an egocentric minimal concept, expressed by “I wouldn’t say S”/ 
“I would say S” (for some target sentence S), from rich socio-centric 
concept IS A PART OF MY COMMUNITY LANGUAGE, predicated of “S”. 
Two related points: fi rst, for producing relevant intuition, only the ego-
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centric minimal concept is needed. Second, this concept is not clearly 
empirical, culled from past experience with one’s own sayings. Its ap-
plication is typically guided by immediate promptings of competence: 
if you ask me about a sentence in my mother tongue, Croatian, what 
I primarily do is that I either just “hear” that this is not what I would 
say, or I try to produce the sentence internally. My verdict is then an 
immediate Yes (or No, or, in the worst case Yes-and-No, e.g. if I am 
very drunk). And the basic data for the linguist are that Ann would say 
such-an-such and would mean such-and-such by the given expression. 
The rest is sociological theory. Remember, when a Chomskyan speaks 
about one’s language, he means one’s idiolect. Ann’s opinion whether 
she is a typical representative of a community, and whether her Eng-
lish is good English are beside the point. Does Ann have to think that 
she is competent in the very language (idiolect) she is speaking? The 
very question sounds ludicrous. Why is this relevant? Because stating 
the judgment about a sentence in one’s idiolect requires far less theory, 
if any at all, than refl ection about social usage. 
Let me rerun a simple scheme of the hypothetical production of a 
syntactic intuition I proposed a decade and half ago (Miščević 2016), 
with an important correction inspired by Michael’s criticism. Here are 
two sentences
 (W) They want to be teachers.
 (W*) *They want to be teacher.
Imagine a native speaker, Ann, accepting the fi rst and rejecting the 
second. Ann can rehearse the sentences in her inner fore, simulating 
producing it, or her linguistic cognitive apparatus can just analyze the 
sentence heard. Or, she can go on asking herself whether she would 
say them, simulating actual saying, as the standard description goes.
















In my earlier presentations of the MoVoC theory I have placed in the 
fi rst box only simulation; Michael has kindly pointed out to my mis-
take, so I have enriched the content of the fi rst box in in the meantime. 
The immediate spontaneous answer is the datum used by the central 
processor to arrive at the belief state, intuition proper. The generation 
of linguistic intuition-states seems to be rather isolated, independent of 
general intelligence, employed in stage 3 theorizing. of our fl ow-chart. 
“CP” stands for “central processor”, the general intelligence.
Similarly, for more complicated structures, like the ones involving 
co-reference.
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 (M) Mary knows that Jane loves herself.
The immediate spontaneous answer is the datum used by the central 
processor to arrive at the belief state, intuition proper. The generation 
of linguistic intuition-states seems to be rather isolated, independent of 
general intelligence, employed in stage 3 theorizing. of our fl ow-chart. 
Second, it seems that the immediate, spontaneous answer (the item no. 
2 on the fl ow chart) , is the item that deserves to be called “intuition”. 
It is not necessary that verdict is unconscious; and if and when it is 
conscious, it seems to be the prime, if not the unique candidate for im-
mediate (and perhaps obvious and compelling) judgment. In that case, 
the empirical testing proposal is just a verbal maneuver; calling the 
last stage, no. 4 “intuition”, instead of stage no. 2.
 On the view I propose, “the Moderate Voice-of-competence 
view”, the answers in no. 2, no. 4. and indirectly in no. 5 are often pro-
duced by, and in such a case, revelatory of the linguistic competence. 
Only the competence has access to grammar, whatever its nature.
 The ordinarist theories all this, since they want to deny the 













The crucial question is whether and how the central processor, i.e. gen-
eral intelligence accessing memory, can quickly analyze complicated 
syntactic structures involved in ordinary sentences, like the ones in-
volving co-reference. The empiricist-ordinarist answer is that the ca-
pacity is due to empirical exercise, like the one characterizing the ex-
pert knowledge of, say, a paleontologist, or a good tennis player. (I call 
it ordinarist, since it fi ts nicely with other views that see intuitions 
as items of ordinary knowledge, most famous of which is the view of 
Tim Williamson (2008). Linguistic ordinarism denies that seemingly 
linguistic judgments form a signifi cant epistemic kind, intuitions, and 
that there is a distinct capacity producing them. 
Roughly, the ordinarist hopes that the contribution of the compe-
tence is minimal, and the holistic contribution of CP maximal and es-
sential. For her, intuitions are basically the products of holistic theo-
rizing, not of special, dedicated competence. This is why they are not 
special, why they contain so much empirical material, and why it is 
wrong to take them to be a priori. I fi nd it incredible. Nothing in our 
ordinary empirical knowledge points to a general structure-recognizing 
empirical ability of this power. And, in his forthcoming book Devitt 
(2019) is quite skeptical about people’s semantic intuitions! He is not 
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rejecting them altogether, but does not want to use them as evidence, 
and criticizes others for using them exclusively as evidence. One can 
read him in a more radical and in a more moderate way: on the radical 
reading, he is rejecting them altogether, on the moderate reading he is 
just demanding the theorist to re-check her intuition appealing to non-
intuitional sources, like elicited production or analysis of the corpus. 
In the discussion, Michael opted for the moderate reading, but some of 
his formulation suggest the radical version. I will say more about the 
variants of the ordinarist view in the sequel. In order to determine who 
is right, we have to discuss the proposals following the fl ow-chart(s) 
stage by stage.
First, our examples of simple contrast between what is syntacti-
cally correct as oppose to incorrect. Take the sentence (H*) “Herself 
loves Mary”, offered to John, and rejected by him. Why did he reject it? 
What is wrong with the sentence, that otherwise looks symmetrical to 
“Mary loves herself”, which is, let us suppose, OK for John? The answer 
is very simple for the professional linguist (Isaac 2008: 178), but less 
so for John’s general intelligence (and for mine as well, for that mat-
ter). The anaphor “Herself” has to be bound. In order for “Herself” to 
be bound, “Mary” should c-command it. However, the structure of the 
sentence, somewhat simplifi ed, looks like this.
 S
   NP1 VP
             Herself
      V  NP2
 
     loves Mary
So, it is not the case that “Mary” c-commands “Herself”. In order to 
produce these answers, John’s internal parsing device should obtain 
the information that “Herself” is not syntactically connected to “Mary” 
in the right way. How can parser arrive at this? This can happen in 
two, or even three ways. First, something resembling the tree, call it 
“mental phrase marker” (I learned the term from David Pereplyot-
chik, so thanks go to him) can be either implemented in a non -explicit, 
non-representational way in the parser, so when the parser runs the 
parsing operation the result is that the sentence does not fi t the men-
tal phrase marker; the operation is either aborted, or some “red light” 
signal is emitted. Alternatively, the mental phrase marker is a full, 
explicit representation, and the parser “draws” it, in the way we did it 
here. Finally, and least probably, some items in the marker are merely 
implicit, others explicit.
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Let us go along with the ordinarists and grant them the hypothesis 
that the mental phrase marker is implemented in an implicit way, so 
that there is no explicit representation in John’s parser isomorphic to 
the tree we draw. If this is the case, what is the output available to the 
general intelligence?
We now pass to co-reference. Remember the sentence “(M) Mary 
knows that Jane loves herself”. The linguist has put to the naïve sub-
ject John two questions, fi rst, Does Mary know that Jane loves her, 
Mary, and the second “So, whom does Jane love?”. The fi rst question 
has been answered in the negative, and the second prompted the an-
swer one would expect, namely that she loves herself, Jane. In order 
to produce these answers, John’s internal parsing device should obtain 
the information that “herself” is in a right and complicated way con-
nected to Jane, and not to Marry. It should have had at its disposition 
something corresponding to our two trees.
The crucial difference between them is the following: In the monster 
tree on the left-hand side, the fi rst NP is co-indexed with the second NP 
containing the anaphor herself, which it also c-commands, and there-
fore binds, but the minimal clause containing the second NP is wrongly 
chosen: it is not the fi rst, but the second one, S2. So, whereas the condi-
tions for binding are fulfi lled, the locality condition is violated. (I am 
retelling the explanation from the textbook). The second tree fulfi lls 
both conditions: “Mary” binds “herself” (co-indexing and c-command 
are satisfi ed), and they occur together in the minimal clause, which is 
S1 itself. So, everything is legal. How can parser arrive at this? Again, 
this can happen in two to three ways, non explicit, non-representation-
al way fully representational or mixed. The analogous story can be told 
for “They want to be teacher”.
2.2. The intuition-core
Suppose we all agree that competence involves at least embodied and 
non-represented rules, and operates according to them. We also agree 
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that the immediate production is a datum. Michael and I went through 
several forms which the contrast between his ordinarism and my com-
petentinalism might take, concentrating upon stages 2 and 3 of each 
view. First, the immediate answer of the competence, stage 2, and its 
origin, the tentative production of the sentence at stage 1. What does 
the immediate answer consist in?
Dunja Jutronić mentioned once the extreme possibility that there is 
almost no answer at all, that competence just reiterates the sentence 
proposed, say “They want to be teacher.” That won’t do, since this is no 
new datum at all.
The second possibility has been put forward in Devitt’s answer to 
my criticism, in the context of discussing the question whether person’s 
answer to the linguist’s question is the datum:
Her answer is not /i.e. the datum-NM/; it is part of the central-processor 
refl ection. The datum is the experience that the answer is about. (2006c: 
594 fn.22)
The experience, as made clear by the context, is “the experience of sim-
ulating the behavior” (2006: 594, the body of the text), i.e. the neural-
verbal behavior of producing or trying to produce the target string.
This is hard to believe. First, subpersonal experiences hopefully 
don’t have qualitative character, so the experience of producing the 
string is just the very producing. Suppose that John’s competence or 
parser thus produces the marked string for “M”, and the CP takes this 
producing as its datum; it is almost like John’s CP watching the com-
petence-parser producing the whole string. We may assume that upon 
receiving the word “herself” the competence looks in the dictionary and 
fi nds out that “herself” is a kind of word that can play the role in a 
noun-phrase. It hypotheses the following simple structure:
   S
 NP1    VP
 Herself
John’s CP is watching attentively, we presume on Devitt’s behalf. Next 
come “loves” and “Mary” so the competence happily merges them:
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   S
 NP1    VP
          Herself
   V    NP2
   loves    Mary
But what kind of information can this give to the CP? Linguistic rules 
are embodied in the competence, and not in the CP, since it is not a 
dedicated linguistic processor, but an all-purpose machine. So, mere 
following the toils of competence does not tell CP much. It has no idea 
about c-command, and can neither fi gure out that “Mary” should c-
command the rest, nor that it does not do so in the tree. Only the com-
petence has, or rather consists of procedural rules, so only it can decide 
whether the target string is acceptable. Devitt’s hypothesis that “The 
datum is the experience that the answer is about.” doesn’t tell us how 
CP could possibly fi gure out the verdict.
Things stand even worse with the second example. Assume for sim-
plicity sake, and leaving the technical issues aside, that the parser 
just follows the order in which it is receiving input, and does not jump 
much ahead (is not a top-down parser). So, upon receiving “Mary” and 
“knows” and consulting lexicon, it disposes with the following “conjec-
ture”:
   S1*
 NP1    VP
 N
   V
 Mary  
   knows 
What does this tell the CP? How much do you have to know to have 
even an inkling that a second sentence is expected on the right-hand 
side? And that an anaphora occurring in that sentence has to follow 
the rules of c-command? The two fi nished trees that we copied from the 
textbook are even more baffl ing for an ordinary CP. The second option 
is a non-starter, unless the ordinarist assumes that all people are the 
linguistic equals of Chomsky.
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Let me introduce the third option, the “minimal signal” option, by 
wondering whether Michael perhaps means something else by his “da-
tum”. Maybe, the competence ends up producing only correct strings; if 
the proposed string is ill-formed it stops, thereby rejecting it, like the 
“save” function in my word program, that just stops if the fi le name I 
want to save contains an illicit letter, thus letting me know that the 
title is not a correct string of letters. Here is a passage from Devitt 
that points in this direction; he is talking about “the normal competent 
speaker”:
If the datum shows that she would have no problem producing or under-
standing the expression, she is likely to deem it grammatical. If the datum 
shows that she has a problem, she will diagnose the problem in light of her 
background theories, linguistic and others, perhaps judging the expression 
ungrammatical, perhaps judging it grammatical but infelicitous or what-
ever. Often these judgments will be immediate and unrefl ective enough to 
count as intuitions. Even when they do count, they are still laden with such 
background theory as she acquired in getting her concept of grammatical-
ity. (2006a: 109–10)
On this reading, at the end of its attempt to process the input string 
the competence signals “No problem” if the string is acceptable, or “I 
have a problem”, if the string is not acceptable (or, even simpler, its 
(re-)producing the string is the signal translatable as Yes, its having a 
problem and perhaps aborting the production the signal translatable 
as No.) So, just by following its toils to the bitter end, the CP can come 
to know its implicit verdict, in our example the negative one. The third 
option is just a development of this later alternative: that the answer 
is just a Yes/No signal in the neural code, translatable by the central 
processor. To make it more vivid, we can liken it to the red light on the 
crossing; the pedestrian interprets it as No, and stops if prudent. The 
ordinarist’s view is that this is very little, my view is that this is the 
core information, the real content of the intuition to be produced at the 
end of the day.
So, we do have here the voice of competence (albeit a discreet one, 
liable to be silenced by interferences) and it looks like intuition and 
feels like intuition. Devitt says explicitly that “(s)omeone who has the 
relevant competence has ready access to a great deal of data that are 
to be explained. She does not have to go out and look for data because 
her competence produces them.” (2006: 105) And the whole motivation 
of Devitt’s project was to get rid of immediate access to (deliverance 
of) competence. Finally, most of the work is done by the answer, our 
stage no.2, the agreed voice of competence. This happens in two ways. 
On the one hand, in many cases the stage no.3, empirical testing, does 
not change the verdict and adds nothing to it. In all these cases, it is 
the answer (no2) that is in its content identical to intuition (no.4), so its 
content just is intuition-content. On the other hand, when the verdict 
is somewhat modifi ed at stage no.3., for instance when it is hedged 
(“I would never say this, but my kids say it all the time, so I guess it’s 
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OK”), the primary intuitional work is really done by the original verdict 
(stage no.2).
Consider again Devitt’s high demands on the naïve subject. Ann is 
supposed already to deploy her “folk linguistic concept of grammati-
cality” to appreciate the connection between this grammaticality and 
competence in the language. And she knows that she is a competent 
speaker and so uses herself as a guide to what the competent speaker 
would do. So she asks herself whether this expression is something 
she would say and what she would make of it if someone else said it. 
Her answer is the datum.” Does the linguist really need all this from 
Ann? Devitt himself kindly suggested in correspondence the negative 
answer. The basic data for the linguist are that Ann would say such-
and-such and would mean such-and-such by the given expression. 
The rest is sociological theory. Remember, when a Chomskyan speaks 
about one’s language, he means one’s idiolect. Ann’s opinion whether 
she is a typical representative of a community, whether her English 
is good English are beside the point. Does Ann have to think that she 
is competent in the very language (idiolect) she is speaking? The very 
question sounds ludicrous. Why is this relevant? Because stating the 
judgment about a sentence in one’s idiolect requires far less theory, if 
any at all, than refl ection about social usage.
The fourth possibility is that the answer is a relatively articulate 
verdict, of the kind “No, this is not a well-formed string”, again formu-
lated in a neural code. I suppose that Michael rejects it, I would leave 
it as an open possibility.
To reiterate, I fi nd fi rst the option empty, and the second option, 
that the datum is experience of simulation itself extremely implausible 
if taken literally. I tend to agree with the minimal signal option of Yes/
No signals, green/red lights in a neural code (and with its subspecies, 
the more tolerant alternative reading of Michael’s “the experience that 
the answer is about”, according to which the successful experience is 
a green light for the string, the aborted simulation a red light.) It has 
the advantage of offering a distinct job to competence, and a distinct 
job to CP, it goes well with poverty of intuitions, their tendency to re-
duce to Yes/No fi nal verdicts, and it is very parsimonious. However, I 
have nothing against the articulate signal option, and would be happy 
if psychologists confi rmed it, since this would make more space for com-
petence and help its voice to be heard more easily. End of stage 2.
2.3. From signal to intuition
This brings us to the work of CP, our stage 3. Here, two opposite pos-
sibilities loom large. Either the empirical theorizing is narrowly lin-
guistic or it is wide, holistic, and could involve language-external, for 
instance social, affective and other considerations.
So, to summarize, the ordinarist can propose either the wider or the 
narrower task(s) for the CP. If the task is wider, it is not specifi cally 
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linguistic; the linguistic job is done by the competence, and the core of 
linguistic intuition is really the decision of the competence, it’s red or 
green light. If the task is narrow, it is just translating the very same 
datum of the competence. Either way, it is the competence that pro-
vides the essential core of the resulting intuition: either its linguistic 
core, on the wide picture, or its total content, on the narrow one, as 
predicted by The Moderate-Voice-of-Competence view.
How does intuition-capacity develop? We know very little about the 
improvement of intuition capacity. Some researchers mention that il-
literate people did not even understand the questions they asked them: 
the people just have no idea of what it could be meant by asking wheth-
er one would say certain things. Robert Matthews provides a piece of 
evidence Devitt reports
This point is nicely illustrated by the following report: “As a graduate stu-
dent I spent a summer in the Pyrenees (Andorra, Perpignon, etc.) doing fi eld 
research on the phonology of various dialects of Catalan. Many of our native 
informants were illiterate peasants. I was forcefully struck how diffi cult 
it was to elicit linguistic judgments from them regarding their language, 
which of course they spoke perfectly well. Just getting the plurals of certain 
nouns was tough. These folks seemed to be very hard of hearing when it 
came to hearing the voice of competence! Their diffi culty, it seemed, was 
that their native language was largely transparent to them—they had nev-
er thought of it as an object for observation and hence were largely unable 
to form even the most rudimentary judgments about its character. Catalan 
speakers with only a modicum of grade school education, by contrast, were 
good informants, presumably because they had learned through their gram-
mar lessons to think of language as an object with various properties, even 
if they had no sophisticated knowledge of what those properties might be, 
theoretically speaking.” (Bob Matthews, in correspondence). (2006a: 109 n)
On one reading, the one I prefer, the informants can’t distinguish ask-
ing about linguistic correctness from asking about pragmatic appropri-
ateness. Maybe, that is, they had diffi culties understanding Mathews’ 
questions: is this gentleman asking whether I would say this under 
some imaginable circumstance (e.g. when drunk, or joking), or whether 
it would be an appropriate statement to make, or something else? It is 
hard to believe that in their normal life they do accept systematically 
ill-formed utterances: in a village, a person with linguistic defi cit might 
be severely ridiculed, and the ridicule seems to speak in favor of other 
villagers having very defi nite intuitions to the effect that something is 
badly wrong with the poor person’s way of talking.
Let me conclude with a few short remarks about the list of problems 
in waiting, connected to the notion of basic competence, as developed 
by Chomsky. How much of its power is due to the innate structure, 
how much to empirical learning? Let me, with the majority, call the 
descriptive-explanatory view that stresses empirical learning “empiri-
cism”, and reserve the term “rationalism” for the opposite descriptive-
explanatory view, that experience plays no essential role in the pro-
cess, beyond mere triggering or prompting. (I shall later be calling 
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the corresponding normative views, concerning justifi cation “aposte-
riorism” and “apriorism” to avoid the confusion between the norma-
tive and the descriptive-explanatory.) The two dynamic processes, rel-
evant here, are fi rst, acquiring the language, and second, improving 
one’s intuition capacity, and they both constitute an important area 
of research. Both seem to involve straightforward learning. Even on 
the most mainstream Chomskyan view, which Michael of course re-
jects, the child’s language module needs external information to fi x the 
parameters characterizing the language of the surroundings. In later 
stages, the child will learn more and more sophisticated facts about the 
language that is going to become her mother-tongue. Does this imply 
(descriptive) empiricism about intuition? Only a bit of it: the scaffold-
ing is given, but some information is learned from surroundings. And it 
might be interesting do discern the fi ne structure…
In my paper “Intuitions: the discreet voice of competence” (2006), 
I have argued that our innate endowment might explain at least the 
very origin of the basic intuition-capacity and the initial stages of the 
formation of our intuition-states with their contents, but that nativism 
should be restricted to the origin of the system and to the relatively 
initial stages of processing. Does the incontestable fact that people’s 
intuitions do develop, and that sophisticated, well-trained people have 
much richer intuitions speak in favor of empiricism? Again, only to 
some extent.
Let me conclude this part of the story by stressing the passion for 
explanation, omnipresent in the debates about linguistic intuitions. 
This passionate “explanationism” has been in the past characterizing 
the debate about all sorts of intuitions, in the work of classics, like Pla-
to, Descartes, Kant, and the early twentieth-century philosophers like 
Russell and Husserl; it is a pity that present-day debate on intuitions 
in general is much less marked by it.
How do the stages of intuition-production fi t with the theoretical 
work in linguistics? The main way a linguist arrives at her theory is 
nowadays by focusing upon speaker’s intuitions. We may add this de-
velopment to our story about stages. Remember, the two last stages 
were the explicit intuition and the report. We now add three more 
stages. The fi rst is putting intuitions together, and streamlining them 
(weeding out contradictions, mistakes and the like); it corresponds to 
building a narrow refl ective equilibrium in the case of other kinds of 
intuitions. Then comes narrow grammatical-linguistic theorizing, and 
fi nally balancing the results with the input from other disciplines: psy-
cholinguistics, neurology, possibly evolutionary biology, and science 
that could help. The result, the Final theory, would be something like 
a wide refl ective equilibrium, encompassing intuitional and other data, 
input from other sciences, and linguist’s theorizing.
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       4          5                  6  7 8         9
 intuition  report  organizing the reports  narrow  input from  the Final Theory
        streamlining them        refl ective       other        = wide refl ective
               equilibrium sciences      equilibrium
So much about intuition. We now turn to the other set of questions, the 
ones concerning the metaphysical status of linguistic entities.
3. Validity of intuitions: 
    Production-and response-dependence
3.1. SLEs are production-and-response-dependent
The idea proposed and briefl y defended above that intuition is just an-
other window upon the linguistic competence suggests that language 
production, understanding and judging go together. It helps to make 
our view of language abilities more unifi ed and systematic. Moreover, 
such a unifi ed picture suggests also a metaphysical framework for lo-
cating language. Here, the question we want to answer is: where is 
language situated in the general order of things? In the mind, in the 
world, or somewhere in-between, straddling the divide. Call this ques-
tion, following the usual usage in metaphysics, the location problem for 
language. Here is how it arises.
Commonsensically, the way the folk hears and sees the linguistic 
tokens seem to suggest that the language is in the outside world, it 
is “the spoken and written stuff”, with no narrower specifi cation. It is 
what was later called E-language by Chomsky. But the folk wisdom has 
been put in doubt, since rather early times, at least since the second 
century AD. Sextus Empiricus in his treatise Against the Grammar-
ians questions the existence of language: for him, the availability of 
sound, syllable, word and sentence are highly dubious. Sounds are 
questionable since we don’t have a clear principle of identifi cation 
that would tell us, for instance, if a diphthong is one sound or two or 
whether a hardly audible “r” in a syllable is a sound or not (I, 117 ff.). 
Words and parts of the sentence, inherit the dubiousness; “if the ag-
gregate of the parts of the sentence is conceived to be a sentence, 
then because the aggregation is nothing apart from the parts ag-
gregated, just as distance is nothing apart from the objects which 
are distant, the sentence of which any parts shall be conceived 
will not be anything. And when the whole sentence is nothing, 
neither will any parts of it exist. I. 135, p. 81). The conclusion is 
that “neither does the sentence exist” (I, 137). Many contempo-
rary linguists and philosophers of language would agree with 
Sextus: in their view, already phonology shows that there is a prob-
lem: the phonetics-phonology interface is complex, and what is heard 
depends heavily on context, and more importantly on expectations and 
habits. This internal, mental component has become even more central 
for the linguists with the advent of Chomskyan linguistics. The ques-
tion now looms large: where should we locate the language?
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Let me detail the problem a bit. Chomsky’s insistence upon the im-
portance of I-language has generated the temptation of radical inter-
nalizing motivated by the wish completely to get rid of the fi rst, ex-
ternal component, that is seen as too contingent, “non-linguistic” and 
unsystematic to be worthy of being called “language” in the strict sense 
at all. “Language, as far as I can tell, is all construction” writes Jack-
endoff (1992: 104, emphasis by Jackendoff), echoing Sextus after almost 
two millennia. He also initiated the comparison between “hearing” the 
linguistic items and “seeing” visual illusions. The invidious comparison 
is later developed by G. Rey (2005) a fervent defender of the picture of 
language as merely internal, even “imagined” and also used by Isaac 
2008: 24). Phonemes, their aggregates (morphemes, internal sentence-
strings), syntactic trees and other “standard linguistic entities” (SLEs 
to use the abbreviation preferred by G. Rey) are in the head, and they 
are the whole of language. Language is I-language, E-language is out.
Another example is the blank screen metaphor offered by John Col-
lins: E-language is like the blank screen onto which linguistic items 
are being projected by our mind. It sounds there is literally nothing out 
there. Take the book with complete works of Shakespeare, and take 
an empty book, just blank pages like movie screen; it can’t be that in 
the case of his complete works there is nothing (written in a language) 
there, that we project the text upon blank pages. Collins has responded 
in the correspondence that he attacked only extreme objectivism, with-
out really wanting to deny that there is E-language outside. But say-
ing, as he does, that “the tokens are there alright, but the properties 
are simply projected onto them” bring the blank screen back in; the 
tokens don’t have any linguistically interesting properties.
Philosophers are sometimes tempted to extremes: in this case to ex-
treme internalization of matters linguistic. The temptation is to halve 
the reality of language. Commonsensically, the language is outside, it’s 
the spoken and written stuff. Comes Chomskyan linguistics and de-
tects another half, the internal one, which turns out to be quite impor-
tant. This generates the radical internalizing temptation to get rid of 
the fi rst half. But such a Sextan line has to be resisted, on the pain of 
linguistic nihilism. Commonsense entities should not be liquidated un-
less it is really necessary. Widespread illusions are not to be postulated 
unless this is absolutely unavoidable. Notice that utterances (speech, 
books, conversations) are (still) part of explanandum in linguistics, so 
E-language is (still) part of the linguistic enterprise. The E-language is 
needed fi rst as crucial input: you need utterances that are acceptable 
or not. Note the importance of the gathering of data, and the fanatical 
attention to the details in the data that characterizes great linguists. 
The strong internalizing move tends to make nonsense out of this im-
portance, and turns linguistics into a rather strange enterprise of non-
accounting for anything at all.
Devitt prefers a strong externalizing move. Language is just a piece 
of non-mental reality, it’s physical signs and body-involving practices, 
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and nothing mental at all. He contrasts linguistic reality to mental 
reality.
Second, the theory building proceeds by accounting for the accept-
ability of these E-language items. The impressive machinery of UG is 
consistently being proposed as an account of reactions of native speak-
ers to utterances proposed or thought of (when the linguist is using her-
self as the linguistic guinea-pig) limited variability of data. The data 
cannot vary indefi nitely and in a chaotic fashion. Especially if simplic-
ity is such a prime ambition: if all of the grammar is to be captured in 
a few very simple and very general principles, then the data should be 
highly organized: all the data should be amenable to the principles. 
Why is the idea of parameter setting so impressive: because it detects 
a deep, very general uniformity, and constraints variation with an iron 
hand!
Finally, note the contrast between folk-superstition and folk view 
of language as being out there in the world. The fi rst ascribes all sorts 
of crazy powers to presumed witches, which the women in question 
just don’t have. Folk-views on language don’t ascribe any crazy stuff 
to sentences. They just fail to add sophisticated stuff, that’s hardly an 
error. So, we need a way to preserve the folk or commonsense view that 
utterances are language.
On the other hand, the path back to the Eden of commonsensical 
fi rm objectivism is also closed, since too much of linguistic material is 
clearly located strictly in human cognitive apparatus. So, why not go 
part of the way with the folk, give unto complete works of Shakespeare 
what belongs unto them, and give to the mind what belongs unto it. 
The answer I favor is therefore that the two halves, the internal and 
the external, E-language and I-language, have to be kept together. This 
is compatible with a wide range of views, from eliminativism (linguis-
tic items are only projected)1 and quasi-eliminativism about them 2, 
to various views that stress speaker’s intention as basic for linguistic 
product(ion)s to the classical Chomskyan stance according to which 
language is essentially a mental thing, and only accidentally has an 
external manifestation. So, how do we choose? I think that the best way 
is the most direct one: language is relational and response-dependent, 
But the answer needs a lot of developing and defending: pointing out 
that it is in the middle between the two extremes would have been able 
to recommend it in times of Aristotle, when the virtue was considered 
to lay in the middle.
In brief, linguistic reality of a language, say French, is pretty much 
determined by the psychological reality of its speakers. The mental 
dispositions and states of native French speakers, determine in the 
last instance, the structure (syntactic, semantic and pragmatic) or our 
language. Capacity of recognizing the correct forms, crucial for intu-
itions, is part of this constitutive structure. A sound-string is a correct 
sentence of a language partly because a competent language speaker 
would recognize it as such. It is obvious that p is a correct sentence of 
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the language iff a normal thinker would fi nd p clear and compelling. 
In this sense, the validity of intuitions is ultimately explained by the 
effi ciency of the wider collective psychological make-up of which they 
are part. The order of determination seems to go from the mind to the 
world. Language is in-between the mind and the world, straddling the 
divide. Let us look at more detail.
Start with the level of phonology. Why is a certain stream of sounds, 
or a series of inscriptions a token of “M”? Because John would have 
intuition that it is, and hear it and read it as a token of “M”. To pass 
further to graphemes, why are the following two very differently look-
ing strings in fact tokens of the same Croatian sentence?
(L) Svaki od dva kandidata očekivao je da će pobijediti onog drugog.
(C) Сваки од два кандидата очекивао је да ће побиједити оног 
другог.
Because a Croatian reader knowledgeable of the Cyrillic script would 
see them so, and, if need arose would write his thought in the form of 
(C). I just did it on my computer, and I count as a Croat with a com-
mand of Cyrillic.
So, the linguistic properties of the sentence seem to be dependent 
on the production and on the responses of the speaker in charge. Let 
me then introduce a new term, with a play of words to boot. Call this 
hypothetical dependence “production- and response-dependence”, PR-
dependence for short. You might take the “PR” as a pun, reminding one 
of “public relations”, which is not bad: a more psychologically minded 
reader might read the term strictly as referring to dependence on indi-
vidual speaker-hearer, a more sociologically minded one as pointing to 
further dependencies. So, a simple relational answer to our metaphysi-
cal location problem would be that linguistic entities are production- 
and -response dependent. In the form of a slogan, SLEs are PR-depen-
dent. (Thanks go to Michael who in discussion warned me that pure 
response-dependence is very, very implausible; he would not accept the 
PR-dependence either.
Let me explain the slogan and argue for it in more detail. The slo-
gan claims the following about any given SLE:
 SLE characterizes a given linguistic (external) token t of L iff a 
normal speaker-hearer of L would accept t and would produce t 
if suitably prompted.
And, the left-hand side determines the right hand one: SLE is a prop-
erty of a given linguistic (external) token t because the normal speaker 
of L would do as specifi ed. With the advent of Chomskian linguistics 
it has become a commonplace that competence in a way dictates what 
counts as the correct, well-formed sentence of a given language. Let us 
pass to illustrations and explanations.
Start with the lowest level. The commonalities between different 
tokens of the same sentence like our (L) and (C), but also of tokens vari-
ously articulated, are recognizable only through the detour through the 
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response of the hearer, call it response-detour. The commonalities are 
also explainable only in terms of the response-detour. Therefore, by in-
ference to the best explanation, the fundamental phonological (-graphe-
matic) properties of the strings are not mind-independent properties. 
An external token string has linguistic properties because it would be 
interpreted as having them by the normal language-hearer, and would 
be produced by a process that would form it respecting the nature of 
these properties. So, they are best seen as PR-dependent properties
The same is valid for fundamental grammatical (-semantic) proper-
ties of the strings, bringing in our discussion of intuitions. We focus 
here upon the fi rst family, the syntactic one.
In researching a given language the linguist has to do with speaker-
hearer, the person who not only produces a string, but also reacts to 
the string itself, so that her reaction, in the form of her intuition and 
report, offer a glimpse into the structure of her I-language. Return for 
the moment to the sentence
(M) Mary knows that Jane loves herself.
and to our two trees.
Now, why does the sentence “M” say that Jane loves herself, Jane, and 
that Mary knows this? Why not that Jane loves Mary; that might have 
been a happier situation. Well because John, the speaker-hearer of the 
language, has intuitions that can be systematized by the two trees, and 
has, presumably, something in his cognitive apparatus that is roughly 
isomorphic to them (either explicit representations, or a sequence of 
processing moves). If he heard “M” systematically in the “Jane-loves-
Mary-who-knows-about-it” way, and produced it to indicate this, then 
the sentence would have had a different (a linguistically “illegal”) syn-
tactic structure represented by the left-hand monster tree. Moreover, 
John would himself produce “M” to mean that Jane loves herself, Jane, 
and would thus testify to the fi delity of the “legal” analysis. The two 
combine in simple cases. (The exceptions and complications concern 
the “impure” intuition we talked about earlier, for instance our hero 
Ina who allows ungrammatical strings out of her love for the non-na-
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tive partner, but does not produce them herself. The other, and indeed 
famous example is the opposite one, studied by Labov: the snobbish 
reaction of not offi cially allowing utterance-tokens of the kind one pro-
duces oneself).
So, the property of the given utterance of “M” of being a token of 
a sentence with the c-command pattern that makes it into a correct 
piece of John’s language, looks like a relational property, that the to-
ken has in virtue of playing a (potential or actual) role in awakening 
John’s responses, including the intuitional ones, and of being poten-
tially produced by John’s linguistic apparatus as a correct item. So, in 
general it seems that the relevant syntactic properties are relational 
properties, that the physical type sentences posses in virtue of being 
related to psycho-grammar (in terms of being produced/-able and be-
ing recognizable/parsable/ as such), i.e. PR-dependent properties. The 
production can be taken in one of the two ways, and I will remain offi -
cially neutral between them. For the representationalists about SLEs, 
respecting a mental phrase marker is to be taken literally: when John 
is producing the sentence “M”, his mental apparatus constructs the 
marker and then organizes the sentence in accordance to the represen-
tation produced (merging and moving its elements with one eye on the 
represented paradigm). A non-representationalist will settle for less: 
the apparatus functions as if it is implementing the phrase marker, it 
follows the rules without representing them, the way planet’s follow 
Kepler’s laws, blindly but reliably. In both cases the best choice is our 
slogan: SLEs are PR-dependent.
But isn’t the tree still merely projected onto the sentence-token by 
John’s mind, a strict internalist might ask. In answer, we should think 
of degrees of projection versus guidance. The fi rst and clearest is total 
projection upon a blank screen, like the movie of tv-screen. The next 
is moderate projection like in the Rorshach test, where the external 
shapes play an auxiliary suggesting role. The third is a mix, combining 
minimal projection with moderate guidance. Take projecting depth or 
perspective into a realistic-style painting of an imaginary landscape. 
The painter has done most of the work, her hand guides the eye of 
the observer; still, an observer with no experience with paintings or 
photographs will have trouble noticing depth. Consider how the three 
cases refl ect on the study of the relevant phenomena. First, nobody 
studies blank screens in order to understand various movies, but, sec-
ond, psychiatrists propose better or worse test, without normally trying 
to account for every point in the drawing within a systematic theory. 
And fi nally, concerning the recovering of depth-information, the typi-
cal art historian pays maximal attention to almost every feature of 
the realistic-style painting. The painting shows with great exactness 
what the painter had in mind. Linguists come closest to the third case, 
with endless, patient search for examples and counterexamples, pairs 
of very similarly looking written sentences, one of which is acceptable 
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and other not. So, the right mix for language is minimal projection and 
maximal guidance. The corpus shows with great exactness what the 
speaker had in mind, sub-personally, of course. And indeed, a volume of 
prose or drama in a given language hardly reminds one of blank screen; 
a post-modernist might see in it a kind of Rorschach, but the scientifi c 
linguistic attention to detail points to the opposite end, the minimal 
projection, exactly as the PR-dependence picture would predict.
Let me conclude by mentioning several interesting issues related to 
the narrow response-dependence, i.e. dependence on the hearer. Sup-
pose that I want to say that Mary is aware of Jane’s love for her, but, 
having previously had a nice portion of my favorite brandy, I produce 
a token of “Mary knows that Jane loves herself”. “You claim she knows 
that Jane is narcissistic?” a colleague asks. Well, this is what I have 
said, and here it is the hearer, the colleague, and her response, that 
decides. The same goes for meaning, in particular public meaning vs. 
speaker’s meaning. The speaker thinks that “promiscuous” is a very 
posh word for “promising” and says: “I like promiscuous candidates.” 
He meant “I like promising candidates”, since this is how he composes 
(produces) and hears (responds to) his sentence. Unfortunately, the 
public meaning is the other, slightly awkward one. Why? Well, my 
dear speaker, because most people would hear your sentence as talking 
about candidates who change their partners a bit too often (for some 
standards). Looks like the public meaning is pretty much narrowly re-
sponse-dependent, defi ned by how people would decode the utterance. 
Now, if (and I say if) the public meaning has primacy, then the hearer 
is privileged in relation to the speaker, and we have strict, narrow re-
sponse-dependence.
On the other hand, in the case of ambiguity, as Devitt has warned 
me in a pleasant discussion in the IUC in Dubrovnik, the speaker 
seems to have the upper hand. If I say, “Visiting relatives can be bor-
ing”, meaning the ritual of visiting them, and you take it the other way 
around, it is me who is the authority. So, dependence on production 
remains, along with the one on response. SLEs are PR-dependent.
3.2. Sketching the big picture: Intuitions and the maximalist 
response-dependentist view
How does the view just sketched, fi t with the rest of our world picture? Are 
there other PR-dependent properties? What about the moral properties 
like right, just and fair? Many people swear these are fully objective, oth-
ers see them as “social constructions” or projections. But there is a middle 
way One can say that an action was just if it would strike an impartial 
observer as being such (or, impartial observers would agree to this effect, 
under one or other guise, including veil of ignorance and similar devices). 
Kantians would insist on the production: the action was right only if it 
was produced with the right intention, the one of doing what is morally re-
quired by the situation. If we combine the two, we get the PR-dependence:
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 An action a is morally right iff it has been produced with the 
intention of doing what is right and is perceived by impartial 
observers as right.
This line has not been explored, and I rest content with just mentioning 
it here. (I got the idea of the moral-linguistic parallel in a conversation 
with Nenad Smokrović, so thanks go to him). Obviously, the language, 
if to some extent mind-dependent, is certainly not alone in being such. 
For pure response-dependence take secondary qualities like bitter and 
red. They are hardly production-dependent, but it is arguable that they 
are response-dependent, and I have argued for the view in several pa-
pers. We may introduce the term “generalized response-dependence”, 
to cover items like SLEs that are both production-and-response-depen-
dent and those that are response-dependent in strict sense. This would 
yield the following division:
  response-dependent in general
    
  narrowly production-and-response-dependent
 response-dependent  = PR-dependent
Now, all the examples (bitter, red, SLEs) are cognitive, as opposed to 
moral-practical. We might add other cognitive examples of the same 
high level, for instance being obvious; it is a property typically accom-
panying intuition-contents. When is it obvious that something is the 
case, e.g. that our (M*) is an incorrect sentence:
 It is obvious that p iff a normal thinker would fi nd p irresistible, 
clear and compelling.
And, the left-hand side determines the right hand one: it is obvious 
that (M*) is incorrect because the normal speaker of John’s language 
would fi nd it compelling that it is so. Our next non-practical example 
are expressive properties, like e.g. happy-looking. A person is happy 
looking because it looks happy to her surrounding, more offi cially be-
cause it would look happy to the relevant group of normal observers. 
What about individual emotional qualities like frightful or sad as pred-
icated to objects and situations? They might be response-dependent as 
well: a scene is frightful because it would frighten the normal observer. 
Our last non-practical example is much more philosophical, aesthetic 
properties like good-looking, beautiful and ugly. Since Hume’s times 
they have been characterized by many philosophers in response-depen-
dentist terms.
Passing now to the minefi eld of other practical candidates for re-
sponse-dependence beside the moral qualities, let me start with the 
least problematic candidates. Take individual attraction and repulsion, 
with qualities like attractive, disgusting, sexy and the like; they are 
probably the least problematic candidates for a response-dependentist 
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account. Social properties like inviting and offensive follow suit. Like 
in the case of language I am in favor of a response-dependentist view. 
Similarly with the “signifi cance” properties, like meaningful or mean-
ingless, particularly for items like a meaningful life.
This is then the fi rst sketch of the big picture: many, perhaps all 
humanly interesting properties are response-dependent in the very 
general sense indicated (involving production-dependence besides the 
narrow dependence on the response of the hearer); language is here 
joined by its peers within a huge family of properties.
4. Conclusion: Explaining intuitions
Let me recapitulate. In the fi rst part I have defended a moderate “voice-
of-competence” view, the view that there are intuitions-dispositions 
and judgments, which form a distinct group of phenomena, and there is 
the intuition-capacity, the capacity to use our linguistic competencies 
in an off-line fashion. It is the voice of competence, most often a dis-
creet one. Intuitional data are thus the minimal “products” of tentative 
linguistic production and primarily not their opinions about the data. 
The data involve no theory and very little proto-theory. Although there 
might be admixtures of guesswork in the conscious production of data, 
these are routinely weaned out by linguists. In contrast, ordinarism 
denies that seemingly linguistic judgments form a signifi cant epistemic 
kind, intuitions, and that there is a distinct capacity producing them. 
I agree with ordinarist about referentialism: intuitions are concerned 
with their external objects, the domain of items and facts. I agree about 
the importance of explanationism in contrast to quietism: items tradi-
tionally described as intuitions require an explanation of having and 
reliability, if possible a causal one. However, I have defended against 
ordinarists the competence-centered option, that is also referentialist 
and explanationist, and proposed a sketch of explanation, featuring the 
hypothetical stages of intuition-generation and the less hypothetical 
ones of refl ection about intuitions.
The second part develops a very rough sketch of what in the reality 
validates our linguistic intuitions. For this, it turns briefl y to the meta-
physics of language, placing it in-between two extremes, the purely 
psychological Chomskyan one and the purely extra-mental, the De-
vitt’s one. With the advent of Chomskyan linguistics the old question 
of where language is situated in the general order of things has been 
partly answered by stressing the role of the mind. The order of determi-
nation seems to go from the mind to the world. The view defended here 
agrees but adds and stresses that language is in-between the mind and 
the world, straddling the divide, and that a sound-string is a correct 
sentence of a language because a competent language speaker would 
recognize it as such. To put it in a more technical sounding terminology, 
language is production- and response-dependent, and being response-
dependent goes together with color, moral, epistemic and aesthetic 
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value and with emotional properties. The two parts offer a sketch of 
a relatively encompassing view of language and linguistic intuitions, 
combining epistemological and metaphysical topics.
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